

Distributed Systems Programming F29NM1

LTl Reasoning: How It Works

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
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Overview

- How processes, system models and properties are represented in SPIN.
- How LTL properties are verified within SPIN.

Processes, Models and Automata

- A **process** is given meaning via an **automata**, *i.e.* a finite-state transition system:
 - set of states (unique initial state);
 - set of state-to-state transitions based upon input stimuli.
- *-Automata: the conventional notion of automata where there exists explicit initial and final states, *i.e.* recognizes finite sequence of stimuli. Acceptance corresponds to final state.
- ω -Automata: an automata which contains an explicit initial state but no final state *i.e.* recognizes an infinite sequence of stimuli (reactive systems). Acceptance requires a different criteria ... (more on slide 5).
- A **system model** is given meaning via an **asynchronous interleaving product of automata**.



LTL Formula via Buchi Automata

- As mentioned above, we are interested in finite state models which give rise to infinite executions.
- A **Buchi Automata** provides one way of expressing acceptance properties for infinite executions.
- Acceptance for a Buchi automata means that there exists a state which is visited infinitely often.
- Any LTL formula can be expressed as a Buchi automata.

LTL Verification via Buchi Automata


- To verify that model M satisfies LTL formula F generate:
 - P the asynchronous interleaving product for model M .
 - B the Buchi automata corresponding to the negation of F .
 - S the synchronous product of B and P .
- If S contains an acceptance cycle then a counter-example to F exists.
- Note that in a synchronous product automata each transition denotes a joint transition of the component transitions.
- The synchronous product allows one to check whether or not a model exhibits a particular LTL property as expressed via a Buchi automata.

A Simple Safety Example

```

bit x=0;
proctype A(){
  do
    :: (x==0) -> x++
  od
}
proctype B(){
  do
    :: (x==1) -> x--
  od
}
init {atomic{ run A(); run B()}}
  
```

Will the above model satisfy the following safety invariant?

$$\square (x == 0 \parallel x == 1)$$


Buggy Model


```

byte x=0;
proctype A(){
  do
    :: true -> x++
  od
}
proctype B(){
  do
    :: (x==1) -> x--
  od
}
init {atomic{ run A(); run B()}}


```

Will the above model satisfy the following safety invariant?

$\square (x == 0 \parallel x == 1)$




Always Eventually



$\square \leadsto P$

Eventually Always




$\leadsto \square P$

Buchi Automata via Promela

- Buchi automata are represented within SPIN via a special process, known as a **never claim**.
- A **never claim** is used to represent a property that should **never** be satisfied during the execution of a model.
- SPIN automatically interleaves the execution of a **never claim** along with the given Promela model.
- SPIN is looking to see if the execution of the **never claim** matches with the execution of the Promela model. A match corresponds to either:
 - an **acceptance cycle** being detected within the **never claim**
 - **termination** of the **never claim** (complete match)

Buchi Automata via Promela



```
never {      /* []<> p */
T0_init:
    if
    :: ((p)) -> goto accept_S9
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_S9:
    if
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
}
```


Generating Never Claims within SPIN

```
never {      /* []<> p */
T0_init:
    if
    :: ((p)) -> goto accept_S9
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_S9:
    if
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
}
```

Given a LTL formula, the LTL property manager (XSPIN) displays the generated never claim. Using SPIN one can also directly generate a never claim for an arbitrary LTL formula, *e.g.* the above never claim was generated by the following command line:

```
spin -f '[]<>p'
```

Buchi Automata via Promela



```
never {      /* <>[] p */
T0_init:
    if
    :: ((p)) -> goto accept_S4
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_S4:
    if
    :: ((p)) -> goto accept_S4
    fi;
}
```


Proving LTL Properties via Never Claims

- It is easier to prove that a model **does not satisfy** a property than it is to prove that it does, *i.e.* it only takes one counter-example to show that a property is not satisfied.
- A never claim is therefore typically used to represent the **negation** of the formula (property) of interest.
- To prove F , a never claim is generated for $\neg F$ – the **negation** of F . SPIN then checks the model against $\neg F$:
 - If an **acceptance cycle** is detected then $\neg F$ is satisfied and a counter-example exists for F .
 - If **no acceptance cycle** is detected then $\neg F$ is not satisfied, and therefore F is satisfied by the model.

Safety Property via Never Claim

```
never { /* ![]p */
T0_init:
    if
        :: (! ((p))) -> goto accept_all
        :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_all:
    skip
}
```

Response Property via Never Claim

```
never {      /* ![] (p -> <>q) */
T0_init:
    if
    :: (! ((q)) && (p)) -> goto accept_S4
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_S4:
    if
    :: (! ((q))) -> goto accept_S4
    fi;
}
```

Precedence Property via Never Claim

```
never {      /* ![] (p -> r U q) */
T0_init:
    if
    :: (! ((q)) && (p)) -> goto accept_S4
    :: (! ((q)) && ! ((r)) && (p)) -> goto accept_all
    :: (1) -> goto T0_init
    fi;
accept_S4:
    if
    :: (! ((q))) -> goto accept_S4
    :: (! ((q)) && ! ((r))) -> goto accept_all
    fi;
accept_all:
    skip
}
```

Summary

Learning outcomes:

- To understand and be able to describe how processes and system models are represented in SPIN.
- To understand and be able to convert between a Buchi automata and an equivalent LTL formula.
- To understand and be able to convert between LTL formulas and **never claims**.
- To be able to explain LTL reasoning within SPIN at the level of Buchi automata and **never claims**.

Recommended reading:

- “The SPIN Model Checker” Gerard J. Holzmann, Addison Wesley, 2004.