Dealing with uncertainty: a pluralist view.

An annotated reading list.

" A wise man considers which side is supported by the greatest number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability". David Hume, Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding, 1748, A. Millar, London.

Socrates and Aristotle were among the first to explore formalized ways of thinking. Plato's dialogue Theaetetus examines methods of thinking. In the next two thousand years, philosophers became increasingly confident in their method for pursuing knowledge. Whitehead and Russel's Principia Mathematica appeared in 1910, when logic and the foundations of mathematics were seen to provide a firm foundation for all reasoning. Analytical philosophy developed this strand of thinking further. It has been defining for Anglo-Saxon thinking ever since. Its emphasis on the analysis of language and the classes used in language provide a linguistic solution for dealing with uncertainty. Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty, and there are philosophical writings on Vagueness (Keefe, Williamson). Logic itself has tried to incorporate reasoning under uncertainty. It has not been successful at this. Inductive reasoning, for example, is not well analyzed in logic.

Statistics developed as an aide to gambling. With counting of combinations of events, it led to the analysis of frequencies. This was the first framework for dealing with uncertainty. It is useful for the analysis of experiments, where a-priori knowledge is a bias that has to be avoided. I have always relied on
Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic Processes by Athanansios Papoulis. Introductory Statistics by Sheldon M. Ross and Introduction to Probability Models by Sheldon M. Ross are also excellent references. These books go beyond basic statistics, of course, and are grounded in the modern theory of probabilities.

Strategy is only one aspect of playing a game. Equally important is the uncertainty about what your opponent will do. The theory of games also developed out of gambling and games of chance. It has developed a framework for decision making under uncertainty. My reference for this is
Game Theory by D Fudenberg and J Tirole, complemented by The Theory of Learning in Games by D Fudenberg and D Levine. Learning and adaptation are essential for dealing with uncertainty.

Equilibria in games are related to the equilibria in micro-economic systems. Microeconomics deals well with the use of utilities to model preferences of agents. You will find a good review of choice, utility, and games in one of the standard microeconomics texts,
Microeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Utilities are overly deterministic for dealing with human preferences. George Shackle's work and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky) have tried to correct this, and neuroeconomics takes this further, see below.

If you extend the complexity of economic agents beyond classical economy, you end up simulating mutli-agent systems of economic decision makers. This has led to the field of agent-based computational economics, ACE. Leigh Tesfatsion is a major contributor, and her
webpage is full of useful info. ACE also leads to agent ecosystems. Ecosystems with an uncertain fitness function are a challenging research topic.

Linguistic classes are a major tool humans use to deal with uncertainty. Linguistics will not help you much with a computational implementation of classes, but there is a vast literature on artificial classifiers.
Pattern Classification by Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, and David G. Stork is a reference by authors who have been working in this field for a long time. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning by Christopher M. Bishop is up-to-date, and Information Theory, Inference and Learning Algorithms by David J. C. MacKay makes the necessary link with information theory. Much of this field used to be called neural networks, but this is a misnomer. Modern pattern classification has nothing to do with the structure of the brain. For a wider view on classifiers in artificial intelligence, see Machine Learning by Tom M. Mitchell. Support vector machines as especially useful classifiers, and Learning with Kernels by B Scholkopf is a clearly written introduction.

Bayesian inference, Markov decision processes, and reinforcement learning all have an intuitive appeal, and link to cognitive science.
Machine Learning by Tom M. Mitchell is a good introduction.

Most books on pattern classification take a Bayesian approach to statistical inference. Most of the Bayesian practitioners are outright hostile to fuzzy logic. This should not be: fuzzy logic is an alternative approach, and was the first to take a distance from modelling uncertainty using probability distributions. It is well founded, and
Fuzzy Logic with Engineering Applications by Timothy J. Ross is a good introduction, with many practical examples. A more fundamental work is Fundamentals of Fuzzy Sets by Didier Dubois and Henri Prade. Dempster-Shafer theory also fits into this programme of relaxing constraints on probability measures.

The notion of probability can be expanded without relying on fuzzy logic. If a probability is dependent on another random variable, it is just a conditional probability, of course. Savage, and now Jeffries have worked on subjective probabilities, see
Subjective Probability by Richard Jeffrey. Indeterminate probabilities (Nau), unreliable probabilities (Gardenfors), and imprecise probabilities (Walley) have all been defined and explored. Recently fuzzy logic has also introduced uncertainty of membership functions, type-2 fuzzy logic.

Psychology has spawned cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience. Decision making under uncertainty is an active research topic in these fields. They are fast absorbing and extending behavioural economics and Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory. Brain imaging is providing data on decision making under uncertainty. A Bayesian interpretation is possible, see
Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding by K Doya. We need to understand better which part of Bayesian decision making is learned, and which part is hardwired in the brain. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain by Paul W. Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Russell Alan Poldrack, and Ernst Fehr will give a fair outline of what we know, and what we don't know.

I try to add two approaches to this varied and extensive list of attempts to formalize dealing with uncertainty as a computational process. First is a theory of fuzzy games. This  combines the achievements of game theory with fuzzy utilities and uncertainty about the moves your opponents are making. It is complementary to Bayesian equilibria in games.

Second, is a pico-economic approach to uncertainty. This takes into account the interconnected networks of neurons, astrocytes and blood vessels in the brain. Classification, generalization, and inductive reasoning are emergent properties of neurons, astrocytes and blood vessels. This research takes into account processes at micron scales that are not visible to current neuroimaging. It's the detail that neuroeconomics is missing.

I have discussed these issues in the Vloesberghs lectures in Brussels in 2010.