Description

In 'standard' AGM belief revision, a deductively closed theory T
is revised with a formula phi, resulting in a revised theory T * phi.
Typically, the negation of phi is in T and has to be
'retracted'. A fairly recent way to model belief revision is
within more general theories of action and change such as dynamic logic.
The seminal publication is 'Two traditions in the logic of belief:
bringing them together', by Segerberg (1996, and 1999). In this
setting a pointed Kripke model for belief in the theory T satisfies in
particular B ~phi, and a dynamic modal operator [* phi], for 'belief
revision with phi', is interpreted as an epistemic state transformer
[[* phi]]. In the resulting epistemic state then holds B phi. There are
also other general frameworks, that have been investigated recently in
AI,
such as situation calculus and fluent calculus. Such dynamic (and
generally epistemic) approaches allow in a natural fashion for
multi-agent
belief revision, for belief revision wi
 th epistemic beliefs (typically: of other agents), and provide
refreshing
insights on irrevocable belief revision and iterated belief revision. 

Current researchers working in this area include: Herzig, Van Ditmarsch,
Labuschagne, Aucher, Van Benthem, Segerberg, Van der Hoek, Kooi,
Demolombe, Rabinowicz, Cantwell, Levesque, Lesperance, Shapiro,
Thielscher, Lang, Marquis. With this workshop we hope to bring together
active researchers in this new area.